We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers, e.g., an airplane boarding system. Arriving early induces a higher waiting cost (waiting before service begins) while arriving late induces a cost because earlier arrivals take the better seats. We first consider arrivals of heterogeneous customers that choose arrival times to minimize the weighted sum of waiting cost and and cost due to expected number of predecessors. We characterize the unique Nash equilibria for this system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider an airline that starts boarding a plane at time 0 and the N customers that are booked to fly on the plane all arrive before boarding starts and wait in a FIFO queue. A customer that has a better rank in the queue gets a better choice of seats and luggage space. Better queue rank is achieved at the cost of additional waiting before service begins. With each customer we can associate a total cost that is an increasing function of its waiting time and its position, or rank, in the queue. For example, the total cost could be a weighted sum of the rank in the queue and the waiting time. Each customer has to choose the time at which to arrive into the queue, i.e., the waiting time before service begins. For a given customer the queue rank that it obtains This work was supported by DST of the Government of India, and Bharti Centre for Communication in the Department of Electrical Engineering of IIT Bombay. 1 depends on the choice of waiting times of the other customers. The customers can be strategic and can choose their arrival time to minimize their individual cost. Thus we have the rudiments of the airplane boarding game which we will define more generally in the following. Now assume that the customers are from a heterogeneous population and that the different types of customers calculate their total costs differently. As an example, for the linear cost function above, the customers could have different weights for the rank and the waiting time. In this case, rather than have a single queue and hence provide egalitarian service, the airline could reduce social cost by providing service differentiation as follows. Maintain two FIFO queues with queue 2 having strict boarding priority over queue 1, i.e., board customers from queue 2 before boarding customers from queue 1. The airline could now charge a fixed premium to the customers who join the higher priority queue. To obtain better seats, i.e., to make their boarding costs lower, the customers can now choose to join the priority queue and trade off some waiting time for payment of the premium. In such a system the customers make two choices-the arrival time and the queue that they plan to join and hence the premium that they will be paying. Once again, the actual total cost for each customer depends on the choice of these parameters by the other customers. We thus have the outline of the basic airplane boarding game in which customers strategically choose two parameters to minimize their individual total cost.
Several budget airlines in fact follow a simple version of the system described above and motivates this paper. In these airlines, seat numbers are not issued at check-in and typically two FIFO queues are maintained at the boarding gate. The premium queue allows service differentiation to a heterogeneous population where different types of customers have different relative values for their time and money and provides an opportunity for the airline to make additional revenue. If there is significant heterogeneity in the customer population then increased differentiation can provide increased revenue. Thus, rather than provide just two priorities, the airline could provide L priority queues with customers in priority l having strict priority over those of strictly less than l. In this paper we consider this general case of the following airplane boarding game.
N customers are to be served by a single server starting at time 0. Different types of customers will be served through L FIFO priority queues with higher priorities charges higher premiums.
Associated with each type of customer is a total cost function that depends on the waiting time, the premium and on the rank in the boarding sequence. The distribution of the types in the customer population is known to the server and to the other customers. Each customer April 21, 2017 DRAFT strategically chooses two parameters, the arrival time and the priority, to minimize its expected cost.
A. Preview of the Results
In this paper our objectives are twofold: (1) studying customers' strategic behavior in their choice of the priority and of the arrival time, and (2) analyzing how the server may tune the service parameters, the number of priority levels and the charge for each of these priority levels, to maximize its revenue. The following is the summary of the key results in the paper.
1) In Section III, we consider a system where customers choose a single priority parameter that we call the grade of service. The service provider offers a continuum of grades of service and defines a pricing function that maps the service grade to a price. Higher service grades have strictly higher priority in boarding. Customers are strategic and choose the service grade and hence the price. For this case we show that the revenue is independent of the pricing function.
Interestingly, we will see that the model considered in this section is very general in that it is applicable to 'finite duration' games like in the airline boarding game where a finite number of customers are to be allocated a finite resource. For this case our results should be interpreted in the spirit of [5] . The results are also applicable to 'infinite duration' games where the customer arrivals and service processes are in a stationary regime; in this case the results are to be interpreted in the spirit of, e.g., [3] , [4] , [13] .
2) In Section IV, we consider the system where the server maintains several FCFS queues at different priority levels. Customers pay a higher price to join a queue with higher priority.
In this case the customers have to select two parameters-the arrival time before boarding starts, and the priority of the queue from which they will receive service. We show that when the prices are fixed, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium that we characterize exactly. We also numerically illustrate the strategic choices of the priority parameters at equilibrium.
3) Finally, in Section V, we investigate how the service provider may set the prices to join the various queues to maximize its revenue. When the number of priority queues are fixed, we show that these prices can be computed by solving a simple dynamic program.
Numerically, we observe that the revenue increases with the number of available queues.
However, the marginal gain of operating additional queues vanishes rapidly with increasing
April 21, 2017 DRAFT number of priorities. In fact we see that for several examples, maintaining three queues may actually yield a revenue that is almost optimal, i.e., three levels of priority is enough to extract a 'close to maximum' revenue.
All proofs are carried in the appendix.
In the next section we provide a brief overview of the relevant literature and delineate them from the results of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The meeting game and the concert queueing game have similarities to the airplane boarding game . We first describe these briefly.
A meeting is scheduled to start at time t but the participants arrive at random times and it usually starts at a random time T when quorum is achieved. Knowing that the meeting does not necessarily start at time t, participants i chooses to arrive at τ i to minimize her costs due to waiting (a function of (T − τ i ) + ), due to inconvenience (a function of (τ i − T ) + ), and due to loss of reputation (a function of (τ i − t) + ). The knowledge of the structure and distribution of these costs among the participants can be strategically used by participant i to choose τ i .
This meeting game has been introduced and studied in [5] . A variant of the meeting game is the 'concert queueing game'. Here the concert hall opens at time t and the attendees queue up for FCFS service; each attendee requires a random service time. Arriving late has the drawback that the better seats will be taken by those who came earlier, whereas arriving early induces a cost of waiting. Attendees strategically choose their arrival time distribution to mitigate these opposing costs. Several versions of this game have been studied in [7] - [9] .
In the airplane boarding game all customers arrive before the start of service which is unlike in the meeting game and in the concert queueing game. Further, all analyses on the concert queueing game consider a single queue while we consider multiple priority queues providing differentiated service to a heterogeneous customer population that values time, money and queue rank (boarding costs) differently.
Queueing systems with customers who value delays differently have been investigated in the queueing and economics literature. Specifically, providing lower delays for customers with higher delay costs and extracting a commensurate payment from them has been of interest for a while now. In an early work on pricing based on differential service, [12] considered a queue in which customers bribe the server and the server provides a 'highest bribe first' service. Strategic
April 21, 2017 DRAFT customers in such a queue has been considered in [2] , [4] , [13] . In fact, our Theorem 1 in Section III of is a generalization of the equilibrium analysis in [4] , [13] . Providing differentiated service to a heterogeneous population through priority queues and pricing the priorities has also been considered in, among others, [14] , [17] . More recent work on priority pricing is in [1] , [11] where only the expected delay contributes to the cost and the weights have a specific form.
Priorities may also be auctioned like in [4] , [13] .
The models in all of the preceding studies have considered what can be termed a 'simple' system where there is only one parameter that the customers chooses. It is the arrival time in [5] , the bid value in [2] , [4] , [12] , [13] and the priority value in [1] , [11] , [14] , [17] . In contrast, in our model, the customer has to choose two parameters-the waiting time and the priority level. The closest system to the one that we consider is that in [6] where the attendees choose both the arrival time and the queue to join. The key difference with our model is that in [6] the queues start their service at different times and could be serving in parallel. Thus in this case there is 'isolation' between the customers that choose different queues.
A more recent work is that of [3] which considers a priority queueing system with a pricing menu. Here the customers have to declare their delay valuation and the focus is on deriving incentive compatible revenue maximizing pricing functions. In our model, type is private information and does not have to be revealed and the choice of the grade of service is made by the customer and not by the service provider.
III. SINGLE QUEUE: CHOOSING THE ARRIVAL TIME
A plane is to board N passengers starting at time 0. The N customers arrive at different times before the boarding starts and form a FIFO queue. The population from which the N customers are drawn is heterogeneous in that different customers value their waiting time differently. Let V = [A, B] ⊂ R + be the set of all passenger types, and let it be endowed with a probability measure that has a cumulative distribution function (CDF) given by C. A customer has to decide how much before the boarding time she has to arrive; we will denote this waiting time by T (v), for every v ∈ V. Waiting time of T (v) implies that the customer arrives at time −T (v). We assume that all customers of the same type make the same decision. If a passenger of class v ∈ V arrives at time −t then her cost is given by
where F (t) denotes the fraction of passengers that choose to arrive before −t on average, Q(t)
is the cost of waiting for t time units, and n v is the weight that a type v customer assigns to it's waiting time cost. Notice that F (t) is a monotonically decreasing function. Further, Q(t), being the waiting time cost of waiting for time t, is a monotonically strictly increasing function in t and Q(0) = 0. Without loss of generality we let n v to be a monotonically strictly increasing function in v. Thus NF (t) represents the cost corresponding to the passenger's position in the queue and n v Q(t) is the total waiting cost for a customer of type v. Now, F (t) is given by
An arriving customer of type v chooses T (v) to minimize its expected cost where the expectation is taken over the customer type distribution C. We seek a stable arrival profile v → T (v)
that minimizes the individual expected cost for all customers. This is also the Nash equilibrium (NE) policy as defined below.
for every v ∈ V.
1
Since customers with larger v value their time more than those with smaller v, we would expect that customers with larger v should arrive earlier in a NE policy. We prove this in Lemma 1.
Further, in Theorem 1 we show that there is a unique NE and also characterize this policy.
Proof: See Appendix A.
is such that there exists a NE policy then it is unique and is given by
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2:
In this paper we will focus on the characterisation of the NE when it exists. The question of the existence of the NE is answered in [10] , [15] , [16] where it is shown that in non-atomic games that have a continuum of players, there exists a pure strategy NE and it is unique. Further, the conditions on Q(·) and n v that yield a NE can be derived from [16] .
Consider an example system where Q(t) = t r for any r > 0. For this system, the NE policy exists and, as proved, is unique. Thus we see that there is a non empty set of Q(·) for which Theorem 1 holds.
A. Extensions and Generalizations
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 can be extended as follows.
1) The preceding results will follow even for the following total cost function for a customer of type v. Let h(x) be an increasing and continuously differentiable function in x and let the cost for a passenger of type v, when she arrives t units of time before boarding, be
Even for this case Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 hold except that the unique NE arrival profile would be given by
where h ′ (x) denotes derivative of h.
2) In (5), note that h(F (t))
is a specific decreasing function of t. Instead, we could also replace t by any decreasing function of t. This is true because if g 1 and g 2 are two decreasing functions over the same domain D, then we can find an increasing function h
3) In the model we assumed that n v was an increasing function. The results follow if n v is a decreasing function, except that T NE (v) now would be a non-decreasing function in v.
This suits our intuition as now the cost of waiting is more for customers with smaller v.
B. A Server with a Continuum of Service Grades
In the preceding, the customer had to choose the time of arrival and that time determined its total cost. If we could treat time as just a parameter we could have different interpretations to the parameter and hence apply it to different systems. The following is an example of such a generalization which results in a relatively different server model but yields an interesting NE arrival profile.
A population of heterogeneous customers, characterized by a type V = [A, B] ⊂ R + , arrive for service. They have to buy a priority w from the server which is priced by the server. Without loss of generality we assume the class of all priorities to be W = [0, 1] and P : W → R + to be the pricing function such that P (w) denotes the price for priority w. We assume P (0) = 0.
Then the cost incurred by a customer of type v when she buys priority w is given by
where n v is an increasing function in v and F (w) is the fraction of customers who choose a priority higher than w. Note that n v P (w) is the cost incurred by the type v customer in buying priority w.
Since, this is only a different interpretation of our original system model, the results of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 hold in this scenario too. Thus, the unique NE is given by
Let us now compute the expected revenue earned by the service provider, and see what price function P will maximize it. For a given price function P (·), the revenue of the service provider is
Substituting (8), we obtain
Observe that R(P ) define above is independent of P (·). Thus, when the customers are strategic and C(v) distribution is known to the customers, the revenue to the service provider is invariant to the the pricing function that is increasing in the priorities! This leads us to argue there is only so much affinity in the market to pay and any pricing function will extract that affinity.
The following is an application to an 'infinite duration' game. A single server queue has 
. This model was first described in [12] in a non game-theoretic setting while the game-theoretic setting is considered in, e.g. [4] , [13] .
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IV. MULTIPLE QUEUES: CUSTOMERS CHOOSE ARRIVAL TIME AND PRIORITY
Now we consider the system of the previous section but with L FCFS queues. Queue l + 1
has strict priority over all queues of priority level l or less, i.e., it is served before queue l for all l = 0 to L − 1. Passengers who join queue l have to pay an admission price of P l . Since queue l + 1 has priority over queue l the server enforces that P l+1 > P l . Queue 0, however, has no admission price, i.e., P 0 = 0.
Let c v (l, t) denote the cost of joining queue l at time t before boarding begins. Then they are defined as follows:
where F l (t), for 0 ≤ l ≤ L − 1, denote the fraction of passengers that wait for t or longer in queue l. Further, m v P is how much a passenger v values price P in relation to his rank in the queue.
Each customer has to determine which queue she wants to join and when to arrive. First, consider a customer of type v who wants to join Queue l. Clearly, her optimal arrival time
For this choice of T l (v), the cost of joining Queue l will be c l (v) c v (l, T l (v)). Thus the optimal randomized choice of queue is obtained from
where
) and q l (v) denotes the probability that a customer of type v would join Queue l. An equilibrium strategy is defined as follows.
l=0 is a NE strategy if, (1) (10) and (11) are satisfied, and (2) for all l ∈ L,
is the fraction of customers that join Queue l and arrive at least t units of time before 0.
denote an equilibrium strategy. We first analyze the system with a single queue, i.e., L = 1, and then proceed to the analysis when there are L queues.
Lemma 1 is first extended to L queues to show that at NE, the optimal joining times at each
Recall that A and B are, respectively, the minimum and the maximum values of the support of v. Thus an implication of this lemma is that at NE, type A customers will be the first to arrive while type B customers will be the last to arrive and this is independently of the queue that they join. This leads us to conclude that
and
for every l ∈ L.
We now see how T NE l (v) would vary from the case when there is only a single queue to that when there are two or more queues. Intuitively, when there are two or more queues, customers would want to come later than they would if there was only a single queue. This is confirmed by the following lemma.
is the arrival time at NE in a single queue system. Using the previous results, we next show that there is a unique NE and at this NE, the strategies are pure. Toward that proof the following assumptions will be made on the system parameters.
(A1) We assume that m v and n v are such that n
does not grow faster than
is a bounded function over v ∈ V. Also,
2 The proofs of (13) and (14) are trivial.
April 21, 2017 DRAFT (A2) We also make an assumption on the minimum difference between the prices to join 'adjacent' queues. Specifically, for every l and l + 1 in L,
(A3) Finally, we assume that m B is small enough so that all queues are occupied, and
The following example illustrates that (A1) and (A2) are not very restrictive. Let v be uniformly distributed over [A, B], n v = v, and
where ǫ > 0. In this case,
Also, note that, if m v satisfies (A2) then so does
, it suffices to have
to satisfy (A2). Further, if A = 0 then m A = ∞, in which case we only require P l+1 − P l > ǫ. In general, this would be the case if m A is sufficiently large. If (A3) is violated the empty queues will be those of higher priority. From an operational point of view there is no reason to have a queue if no customer is going to join it, especially a high priced queue.
Theorem 3: The NE strategy is unique and is characterized by
Here
for all l = 1 to L − 1, each of which has a unique solution.
Proof: The outline of the proof is as follows.
1) Lemma 4 first shows that for type A customers, the optimal queue joining cost, c l (A), increases in l, whereas for type B customers this cost, c l (B), decreases in l.
2) Lemma 5 shows that
3) Using this, in the third part of Lemma 5, we show that for every l the cost functions c l−1 (v) and c l (v) intersect at a unique point v l and these thresholds {v l } L−1 l=1 satisfy
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and j ∈ L.
3
This proves that at NE we have (17). The details are in Appendix E.
We now give an explicit characterization of the NE arrival times, T NE l (v), and the thresholds, {v l } L l=0 , in the following theorem. Theorem 4: At NE, the arrival time to Queue l is given by
Further, the thresholds {v l } L l=0 can be computed by solving
Proof: See Appendix F.
We illustrate the preceding results with an example. Consider a boarding game with V = [0, 20] and the customer population distributed uniformly over V. The service provider operates three queues with respective prices P 0 = 0, P 1 = 8.75, and P 2 = 11.45. Let N = 10, n v = v, and m v modified from (16) as follows.
For this example, we choose δ = 0.05. Figure 1 plots the arrival times at the three queues. Observe that T NE l (v) is non-increasing in v, the result of Lemma 2. The optimal arrival time for each customer type when there is only a single queue is also shown. Observe that it is greater than the arrival times at each queue for the three queue example. This concurs with Lemma 3. We only plot the arrival times for v ≥ 10.
For v < 10 the time to join the 0-th queue increases rapidly, however, it does remain upper bounded by the optimal joining time if there was a single queue.
To illustrate the thresholds at NE, the optimal joining costs, c l (v), for each queue is plotted as a function of v in Figure 2 . A customer will join Queue l if it offers it the least optimal joining cost. Thus, the crossing points between the optimal joining costs determine the thresholds; this is observed clearly in Figure 2 .
A. Discussion
We now explore how the NE strategy depends on the system parameters, specifically on the prices. We consider a two-queue boarding game with customer types uniformly distributed over [5, 15] . n v = v and m v is given by (19). Figure 3 plots the threshold v 1 as a function of the price, P, of the priority queue. Observe that v 1 increases with P. This is intuitive because the incentive to join the high priority queue is diminished as the price increases. In fact, for δ = 0.01, we find that v 1 = B when P = 100ǫ.
However, this is not true when δ = 0, in which case v 1 keeps increasing to B, but is never equal to it. Investigating this further, since NF 1 (0) is the number of customers joining Queue In Figure 4 , we plot the revenue (normalized by Nǫ) as a function of the price P (normalized by ǫ). For δ = 0, we observe that the revenue keeps increasing as P is increased, while for δ = 0.01 there is an optimal choice of P at which the revenue attains its maximum. Note that δ = 0 (resp. δ > 0,) corresponds to the case when m B = 0 (resp. m B > 0). Hence, the intuition is that when m B = 0, there are always customers (close to customers of type B) who do not value money much. Therefore, the service provider can always increase her revenue by setting a higher price for the priority queue. On the contrary, when m B > 0, there exists a price P, large enough, that customers of type B cannot afford. The latter decide to join Queue 0.
In the previous discussions, we have considered m v that decreases more rapidly for smaller v than it does for larger v. Now consider a system where m v decreases linearly, i.e.,
We now investigate the two-queue boarding game with m v as above, n v = v, and Q(t) = t, and In the previous section, the admission price to each of the L queues was assumed given and we provided a complete characterization of the NE strategy. In this section, we investigate how the service provider can maximize its revenue by appropriately setting the prices P l . Our motivational setting is the airplane boarding system where customers have already purchased their tickets. Hence it is reasonable to assume that there is one queue, the lowest priority queue, where there is no premium, i.e., P 0 = 0. Thus although the customers cannot balk, the existence of the a 'free queue' ensures that the revenue is not an increasing function of the premiums in the higher priority queues and there will be an optimum value for these prices. Further, increased service differentiation allows for increased revenues. In this section we first determine the optimum prices for a given L and then numerically analyze the effect of increasing L.
For the L queue system, F l (0) is the fraction of customers that joined Queue l and, hence,
is the total number of customers that join Queue l. The revenue earned by the service provider is given by
We know that, at NE, (18) gives a bijective relation between P l and v l . Using these, we can express revenue as follows:
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Thus, maximizing
1 N R(P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P L−1 ) can be solved as a finite horizon dynamic program (FHDP). Notice that the first term in the expansion depends only on v L−1 (action at time 1 in the FHDP), the second term depends only on v L−2 and v L−1 (action and state of the system at time t = 2), the third term depends only on v L−3 and v L−2 (action and state of the system at time t = 3), and so on. We assume that the FHDP has a solution and verify this numerically.
We now numerically evaluate the revenue maximizing prices by solving the FHDP. As before,
and type is uniformly distributed. There are L queues, N = 10, n v = v, and m v is as in (19) with δ = 0.05. Table I lists the revenue maximizing prices and thresholds when A = 0 and B = 150 for L = 2, 3, and 4. We observe that as the number of queues is increased, for maximum revenue, P l has to be decreased at each Queue l. This has been consistently observed for other system parameters.
In Table II Another observation from the results of Table II is that the revenue is larger when the type distribution is U[0, 150]. Numerically, it is consistently observed that ifṼ ⊂ V, then the boarding game with types in V yields greater maximum revenue than withṼ; a larger diversity of types provides a larger revenue.
VI. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The system that we have introduced in this paper can be seen to belong to a class of queueing systems where the arrival times are endogenously determined by the customers; unlike the exogenously determined arrival times in traditional queueing systems. Clearly, there are several potential applications for systems with endogenous arrivals in modeling waiting systems at airports, bus and train terminals, concert halls, etc. A better understanding of these systems can help in a more informed sizing of waiting facilities.
Several extensions are possible. An extension of immediate interest is to develop a learning algorithm to obtain the revenue maximizing prices. Specifically, since such a game would be played out repeatedly, the outcome of each instance may be used to adapt the prices to maximize the revenue. A second extension would be to allow customers to balk if the cost is higher than the value of obtaining service. 
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof uses the optimality of T NE (v) and T NE (v + h) for c v (·) and c v+h (·), respectively, and the structure of the cost function.
Similarly, we can get
Adding the two we obtain
Note that n v+h > n v , as n v is a strictly increasing function. Therefore,
This implies that
is a strictly increasing function.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
First note that F (T NE (v)) = C(v). This is derived using (2) as follows.
because C is a non-atomic distribution, and the second equality follows from Lemma 1. Now, since T NE (v) is a NE, by first order condition on (7), we have
where Q ′ (x) denotes derivative Q with respect to x. Differentiating (23) with respect to v we
Substituting (25) in (24), we obtain
Integrating both sides with respect to v, we get
This implies
Note that T N E (v) is a non-increasing function. Thus, users of type B arrive last in the queue. If 
C. Proof of Lemma 2
For notational simplicity, we shall denote D(l, t) to mean
in this section. Thus, the cost of a customer v is given by
Comparing the costs of customer v and v + h, we have
The last inequality follows because
Adding the two inequalities, namely, (31) and (33), we get
Since, n v is an increasing function of v, (34) reduces to Q T
D. Proof of Lemma 3
By Definition 2,
where the last equality follows due to Lemma 2. Now define
Then, we have
Also, the first order derivative condition for the optimality of T NE l (v), namely,
Substituting (37) in (38), we get
This can be simplified to
where, while the second inequality follows from G l (v) ≤ C(v), the first equality uses (13) and the same arguments that are used in Appendix B to arrive at the explicit expression of w NE (v).
E. Proof of Theorem 3
For the ease of presentation, we denote
In the following lemma, we prove that c l (A) increases, while c l (B) decreases in l.
Lemma 4: c l (A) strictly increases and c l (B) strictly decreases in l.
Proof:
The optimal cost to join Queue l is given by
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where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that Q(·) is an increasing function.
Using the fact that n x is a decreasing function and
Using this in (42) gives
where the last inequality follows from (A2).
At v = B, we have
where the last equality follows from (13) and the fact that Q(0) = 0. Now,
from (A3).
We now prove some properties of the optimal costs c l (v) which help us in arriving at the thresholds.
Lemma 5: For the optimal costs, c l (v)s, the following is true 1)
3) There exists a unique point v l , for every l, at which the two costs, namely, c l−1 (v) and
Proof: Taking the derivative of c l (v) w.r.t. v we get
Using the first order optimality condition for
in (44) we get
For l = 0, since P 0 = 0, we have
which follows from the fact that n v is an increasing function in v and Q(·) always positive. Now, for l ≥ 1, using Lemma 3 in (46) and the fact that Q(·) is an increasing function, we
where the last inequality follows from the fact that −m ′ v > 0 and (A2): since P j −P j−1 > Ny(v) implies
Analyzing the difference between
, we obtain
where the last inequality follows from (A2), while the third in the third step we use Lemma 3 and the property that Q(·) is increasing. This proves part 1 and 2 of the Lemma. This implies that no customer will join Queue l contradicting (A3).
We now prove that joining Queue l is the best strategy for all v ∈ (v l , v l+1 ] . For this, it needs to be verified that
The following lemma provides some sufficient conditions for it. We later show that the optimal cost functions c l (v) satisfy these sufficient conditions.
Proof:
due to (51) and the fact that v j < v j+1 . Also, by (50),
Thus,
We now show, by using Lemma 5, that the conditions of Lemma 6 are indeed satisfied and,
By Taylor series expansion, for some y ∈ (v, v 1 ), we have
where the last inequality follows because (v − v 1 ) < 0 and
where the last inequality holds as (v − v 1 ) < 0 and (54) and (55),
2) Take l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L−2}. Take a v > v l . By mean value theorem, there exists a z ∈ (v l , v)
Since,
which is nothing but
Similarly, if we take a v < v l+1 there exists a z ∈ (v l , v), by the mean value theorem, such that
, which reduces to
by using Lemma 5; but (58) is nothing but
for all v < v l+1 .
This proves all the conditions of Lemma 6.
F. Proof of Theorem 4
Take v ∈ (v l , v l+1 ] , then
where the second equality follows from Lemma 2 and Theorem 3. Differentiating (60) w.r.t. v, we get
For optimality, T NE l (v) must also satisfy the first order condition, namely, dcv(l,t) dt = 0. This gives
Substituting (61) in (62), we get
This gives
where α is the integration constant that can be shown to equal 0 using the same line of arguments as in Appendix B while deriving w NE (v) in explicit form.
Further, since T 
Also, note that at Queue l arrival of customer v = v l is the earliest. Thus, 
For obtaining the thresholds {v l } L−1 l=1 we look at the optimal queue joining cost. The optimal joining cost for Queue l is This can be re-written as (18).
G. Derivation of the Revenue Function
We can re-write (18) as
for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . L − 1}. Adding (66) for all l = 1 to L − 1, we get
We use P to denote the price vector (P 1 , . . . , P L−1 ). Revenue function can be expanded as
Substituting (66) and (67), we obtain
which can be written as
This can be simplified as
Note that the first term in the second sum is 0. Hence, by increasing index of the second summation this can be re-written as
This is noting but
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